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ABSTRACT
Objective: Recent reviews of discrete choice methodology identiﬁed meth-
odological issues warranting further exploration, including the issue of
“framing.” The objective of this study was to conduct a methodological
exploration of the effect of attribute framing on marginal rates of substitu-
tion (MRS), including willingness to pay (WTP) from a discrete choice
experiment (DCE), within the context of colorectal cancer screening
preferences.
Methods: The survey, a fractional factorial design of a two-alternative,
unlabeled experiment, was mailed to a sample of 1920 subjects in NSW,
Australia. Participantswere randomized to one of four alternative “frames”
of information. Attributes included: accuracy of the test for ﬁnding cancers,
accuracy of the test for ﬁnding large polyps, how good the test is at saying
you don’t have cancer, cost, dietary and medication restrictions and sample
collection. A mixed logit model was used to estimate pre ferences; MRS
between attributes, including WTP, was calculated.
Results: A total of 1157 surveys from 1920 (60.2%) were returned.
Accuracy of the test for ﬁnding cancer was most likely to inﬂuence choice
of test, followed by accuracy of the test for ﬁnding large polyps. Under
some circumstances, framing of the attributes (e.g., cancers found vs.
cancers missed) inﬂuenced the relative importance of attributes. Attribute
framing signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced estimates of WTP, and beneﬁt: harm trade-
offs that were calculated from MRS.
Conclusions: Attribute framing can inﬂuence willingness to pay and
beneﬁt: harm trade-offs from DCEs. Appropriate design and analysis
methods should be explored to further characterize the inﬂuence and
extent of framing in discrete choice studies.
Keywords: colorectal cancer, discrete choice experiments, preferences,
screening.
Introduction
The context in which a decision is made can be an important
determinant of outcomes. Context can be broadly thought of as
including observable variables, characteristics of individuals,
characteristics of the preference or choice task itself, and envi-
ronmental features such as timing [1]. “Framing” is an example
where the way in which information presented in a stated pref-
erence experiment can inﬂuence utility. Framing effects are well
known [2–4]; however, their inﬂuence in discrete choice experi-
ments (DCEs) is largely untested.
Recent reviews of discrete choice methodology [5–9] have
identiﬁed methodological issues relating to preference elicitation
that warrant further exploration. Some authors [7,9] discuss the
importance of context in discrete choice studies, although others
[6–8] discuss psychological issues such as use of heuristics, risk
interpretation [5], and the implications of attribute framing.
This article considers one aspect of context: the impact of
attribute framing in a DCE concerning preferences for immu-
nochemical faecal occult blood tests (FOBTs) for screening for
colorectal cancer (CRC).
Framing Risk
Discrete choice experiments (DCEs) often include risk or prob-
abilities of outcomes as attributes [10]. When attributes are
presented as risks, respondents are required to process probabi-
listic information and value outcomes within the bounds of ratio-
nality. The way in which probabilities are framed can inﬂuence
an individual’s decision-making behavior, for example, gains
compared to losses, or relative risk compared to absolute risk
[11,12]. Recent reviews have suggested that the implications on
inclusion of risk or probability attributes, and attribute framing
in DCEs should be investigated [5–9].
Outside DCEs, there is evidence that minor changes in the
presentation or framing of prospects can have an impact upon
the choices made. Kahneman and Tversky [4] found that altering
the presentation of probabilities and outcomes can induce
changes in individuals’ interpretation of information and subse-
quent decision-making behavior. By changing the labelling of
outcomes, as described in their famous “Asian disease” example
[13], the more attractive option was dependent on whether out-
comes were framed as lives saved, or lives lost. The options
differed only in how the problem was framed. Similar framing
effects have been demonstrated in other ﬁelds, including: public
policy, taxation, health, contract negotiations, political prefer-
ences, and environmental policy [14–22].
Although identiﬁed as a potential methodological issue in the
discrete choice literature, we are unaware of any published
studies that have speciﬁcally examined the inﬂuence of attribute
framing on choices made during DCEs in health. Two studies
outside health, one in transportation [23,24] and one in environ-
mental economics [25], have attempted to evaluate framing in
DCEs. Hess et al. [23,24] evaluated whether positive and nega-
tive changes in travel time attribute levels from a prespeciﬁed
reference alternative of a “current trip” were symmetrical. They
found that increases and decreases in attribute levels were valued
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asymmetrically, indicating that gains and losses from a prespeci-
ﬁed reference point did not have the same value. Although Rolfe
et al. [25] purport to evaluate framing effects, they do not con-
sider framing in the same context as implied above, that is, as a
failure of description invariance. Instead, they evaluate the inﬂu-
ence of the presence or absence of particular attributes or levels
of attributes.
This current study was designed speciﬁcally as a method-
ological exploration of the inﬂuence of attribute framing in
DCEs. The exploration of framing is set within the context of a
DCE for preferences for screening for CRC. Attributes describing
the potential beneﬁts and harms of screening tests were presented
in both positive and negative frames. Speciﬁcally, framing of the
attributes was manipulated to be positive (the number of cancers
found, the number of large polyps found) or negative (the
number of cancers missed, the number of large polyps missed).
The aim of this study was to conduct a methodological explora-
tion of the effect of attribute framing on marginal rates of
substitution (MRS), including willingness to pay (WTP), from a
DCE.
Methods
Testing the effects of attribute framing was embedded within the
design of a discrete choice study on preferences for FOBTs. The
study followed the methods for conducting DCEs in health care
as outlined by Ryan and Farrar [26].
Identiﬁcation and Deﬁnition of the Attributes
A systematic review of the literature was conducted to identify
the attributes of FOB testing for bowel cancer that were impor-
tant to consumers. Goel et al. [27] found that characteristics
associated with the process of testing, such as number of stool
samples required, as well as cost and test accuracy characteris-
tics, were factors mentioned as concerns by participants. Salkeld
et al. [28] also identiﬁed similar characteristics: process attributes
such as G.P. involvement in recommending, obtaining and check-
ing the completed test; test result notiﬁcation; test accuracy,
sensitivity and speciﬁcity; the implications for early detection and
treatment, including reduced risk of CRC mortality; and cost
were all identiﬁed by respondents as factors that would inﬂuence
them when considering an FOBT. Consistent with qualitative
data, previous DCEs [29–31] have found that a number of dif-
ferent test attributes are important to consumers. These included
test accuracy characteristics (deaths prevented [30], likelihood of
a false positive test result, unnecessary colonoscopies) [30,31],
process attributes (dietary and medication restrictions [29], G.P.
supervision of the test [29], notiﬁcation strategy for negative test
results [30]), and cost [29,31].
These data suggested the following attributes were important
to consumers: test sensitivity (accuracy of the test at ﬁnding
cancers, accuracy of the test at ﬁnding large polyps, test speci-
ﬁcity (how good the test is at saying you do not have cancer), out
of pocket cost, dietary and medication restrictions required, and
how the stool sample is collected (Table 1).
Framing of Attributes
The test sensitivity attributes for cancer and large polyps could be
framed as either cancers found (true positive) or cancers missed
(false negative). Test speciﬁcity (how good the test is at saying
you do not have cancer) could also be presented in two different
ways: number of people reassured that they do not have
cancer—reassurance (true negative) and number of people
who have unnecessary colonoscopies (false positive). Attribute
descriptors are presented in Table 1; full attribute descriptions as
presented in the survey are available from authors on request.
Attribute Levels
The levels assigned to each of the four attributes are presented in
Table 1. Attributes 5 (dietary and medication restrictions) and 6
(sample collection) were ﬁxed across alternatives in a choice set.
A systematic review of the literature concerning the diagnos-
tic accuracy of immunochemical FOBTs was conducted in
September 2004 to inform the calculation of test accuracy levels.
We restricted consideration of test accuracy to the two immu-
nochemical FOBTs used in the Australian National Bowel
Cancer Screening Pilot [32]; the “Inform” test (also known as
“Insure”) and the “Bayer Detect” test [33–37].
Estimates of test sensitivity, speciﬁcity, positive and negative
predictive values were calculated for the tests for detection of
cancers and detection of adenomas with a size greater than
10 mm (large polyps); these formed the basis of the test accuracy
attributes levels.
At the time of the design of the DCE, the direct to consumer
cost of immunochemical FOB tests was AUD$28. A plausible
range around this cost was applied. Plausibility of the range for
the cost attribute was imperative to ensure that respondents took
Table 1 Attribute levels
Attribute Attribute levels
Presented
in which
frame?
1. Accuracy of test for cancers
How many cancers the test
will ﬁnd
55 out of 100 cancers Frame 1
65 out of 100 cancers Frame 3
75 out of 100 cancers
85 out of 100 cancers
How many cancers the test
will miss
45 out of 100 cancers Frame 2
35 out of 100 cancers Frame 4
25 out of 100 cancers
15 out of 100 cancers
2. Accuracy of the test for
large polyps
How many large polyps the
test will ﬁnd
35 out of 100 large polyps Frame 1
45 out of 100 large polyps Frame 3
55 out of 100 large polyps
65 out of 100 large polyps
How many large polyps the
test will miss
65 out of 100 large polyps Frame 2
55 out of 100 large polyps Frame 4
45 out of 100 large polyps
35 out of 100 large polyps
3. How accurate the test
is at saying you do
NOT have cancer
The number of people who
are correctly reassured
by the test that they do
NOT have cancer
800 out of 1000 people Frame 1
850 out of 1000 people Frame 4
900 out of 1000 people
950 out of 1000 people
The number of people who
have unnecessary
colonoscopies
60 out of 1000 people Frame 2
80 out of 1000 people Frame 3
100 out of 1000 people
120 out of 1000 people
4. Cost $20 All
$30
$40
$50
5. Dietary and medication
restrictions
No All
6. How the sample is
collected
Brush stool surface
gently then dab
on test kit
All
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the questions seriously, as respondents were familiar with paying
substantially less (around AUD$7) for the Rotary Bowelscan
Hemoccult test (see Study Sample below) (Table 1).
Experimental Design
Each framewas aDCE that consisted of two alternatives with four
attributes with four levels and two attributes with one level. Four
attributes with four levels and two attributes with one level yields
256 combinations (4 levels4 attributes ¥ 1 levels2 attributes) (65,536 com-
binations with two alternatives). As is common practice, a sys-
tematic subset for two alternatives was selected using a fractional
factorial design according to previously speciﬁed principles
[38,39]. The design was chosen such that it minimized the number
of questions with the same attribute levels (minimal overlap)
between alternatives and ensured that the total number of times a
given level appeared was balanced (level balance) [38,39]. The
D-efﬁciency of the design for each frame indicated that the design
was also efﬁcient (D-errors < 0.0003) [39–41].
A pilot study of the DCE was conducted in 40 participants
(10 per frame). The pilot survey indicated that respondents were
able to complete 16 discrete choice questions without undue
burden. Respondents were also able to understand and correctly
interpret the attribute descriptions. The ﬁnal fractional factorial
design used a block design with a block size of 16; the 256 choice
sets from each frame were divided into 16 blocks with 16 ques-
tions each; two questions were repeated to assess consistency,
giving a total of 18 questions.
Survey Format
The postal survey used a dichotomous forced choice; participants
had previously demonstrated a preference to be tested for bowel
cancer by purchasing a Rotary Bowelscan FOBT test kit. Because
this DCE was speciﬁcally designed to examine framing effects,
rather than to inform CRC screening policy decisions, a forced
choice was considered appropriate. An example of the choice
task is provided in Appendix A. No ﬁnancial incentives were
provided, and a follow-up letter and copy of the questionnaire
were resent at 6 weeks to nonresponders.
Study Sample and Setting
The sampling frame was men and women who had purchased an
FOBT from the Central Coast Rotary Bowelscan Program in the
previous 12 months (21,297 participants).
Sample size calculations were conducted as described in
Louviere et al. [41]. A sample size of 480 for each survey frame
was required to detect a true proportion, 10%, with a relative
accuracy of 10% of P, and a probability (a) of between 95% and
99% (assuming a ﬁnal response rate of 50%). Thus, a total
sample of 1920 (four frames of 480 respondents) received the
postal questionnaires. Participants were randomly assigned to a
frame of the questionnaire (1–4) and then to one of the 16 groups
within that frame.
Econometric Analysis
Mixed Logit Model
A mixed logit (ML) model was used for analysis. The statistical
analysis of choice data is based on the random utility model
[42–45]; each respondent faces a choice among j alternatives over
s scenarios. The random utility theory (RUT) framework pro-
poses that the utility that individual i derives from alternative j in
scenario s can be separated into a systematic, or explainable,
component and a stochastic (random) component. The utility
function consists of an outcome (dependent) variable and
explanatory variables. The outcome variable is the choice
between two or more alternatives made by respondents for each
proﬁle in the questionnaire, although explanatory variables are
observed or unobserved. Observed variables can be the attributes
used to describe the tests, or other observed characteristics of
respondents such as demographics. Unobserved variables are
represented by a random component in the explanatory vari-
ables. The decision-making process within a DCE is therefore
based on a comparison of indirect utility functions. In each
choice set, the respondent is assumed to choose the alternative
that leads to the higher level of utility, based on the notion that
respondents behave as utility maximizers. The utility that indi-
vidual i derives from alternative j in scenario s can be expressed
U Xisj isj i isj= ′ +β ε (1)
Where Xisj is a K ¥ 1 vector of explanatory variables and bi is the
vector of coefﬁcients.
Conditional on bi, a standard multinomial logit (MNL)
results, assuming the disturbance terms are identically and inde-
pendently distributed as extreme value. The probability that
individual i chooses alternative j in scenario s is thus:
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This MNL model speciﬁcation can be generalized to allow for
possible heterogeneity across individuals. In this generalization
β β σ ωki i k k kiZ k K= ′ + =, , . . .1 (3)
where Zi is a vector of observed characteristics of the respondent
i, the bk are parameter vectors and skwki represents unobserved
heterogeneity in the preference weights. The resultant model is
termed a random parameter or ML model. The wki follow stan-
dard normal distributions, and are independent of eisj, and of
each other. Under this model bki can vary across individuals, but
not across the repeated choices made by that individual. Thus,
the common “panel” structure of the data is accounted for by
introducing error correlation over choice scenarios.
Mixed logit have a number of properties that are intuitively
appealing: they can take account of parameter heterogeneity
across a population by using random, rather than ﬁxed param-
eters and they can take account of multiple correlated responses
from single individuals, by deriving the individual’s conditional
distribution based (within sample) on their choices [46–48]. They
have recently become popular in the literature, and are gradually
being used more frequently in the analysis of stated preferences
for health-care services [49–52].
Model Estimation
Table 2 indicates the variables included in the MNL and ML
models.
Respondents chose between two alternatives in each of the 16
unlabelled choice scenarios. The conceptual framework for DCEs
draws on Lancaster’s economic theory of value [53,54] as well as
on RUT [43–45]. Random utility models were used to deﬁne the
utility of choice alternatives, as a function of the attributes. In each
choice set, the respondent is assumed to choose the alternative that
leads to the higher level of utility, based on the notion that
respondents behave as utility maximizers.
VTest = + + + +β β β β
β
0 cafind lpfind reass
cost
CAFIND LPFIND REASS
COST + + + +
+
β β β
β ε
age sex risk
famhistory T
AGE SEX RISK
FAMHISTORY 1 (4)
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The utility functions estimated included random and nonran-
dom parameters. Random parameters need to take account of
the distributional assumptions placed upon them in the model;
the true distribution of a random parameter is not known so an
analytical distribution—such as normal, lognormal or triangle—
is modeled as an approximation [47,48]. The utility function is
estimated such that the outcome variable is the value in moving
from one test to another, within each frame of information. In
this analysis, normal distributions were applied to all random
parameters (Table 2).
The b parameters can be interpreted as relative importance of
the attributes, and were used to assess the effect of framing on
attribute importance, and on the MRS between attributes,
including WTP.
Models were evaluated for goodness of ﬁt using the likeli-
hood ratio chi-square statistic for the global test of zero model
coefﬁcients, the McFadden’s pseudo R2, and Akaike’s informa-
tion criterion (AIC). Model results are expressed as parameter
estimates, 95% conﬁdence intervals and P-values. Model vari-
ables were effects coded and all analyses were conducted using
10,000 Halton draws in NLOGIT Version 4.0.
Results
Between December 2004 and April 2005, 1157 from 1920 ran-
domly selected Rotary Bowelscan participants completed and
returned the questionnaire, giving an overall response rate of
60.2%. A summary of respondent demographic characteristics is
presented in Table 3. There was no signiﬁcant difference between
the demographic characteristics of respondent groups. Overall,
<1% of respondents (11 from 1157) failed the two consistency
questions. There was no difference in model parameter estimates
with and without these respondents. Therefore, all respondents
were included in analyses. Table 4 presents the results of the basic
MNL model and the ML model.
Results for both the MNL and ML models indicated that
attributes (of the tests) were highly statistically signiﬁcant. Accu-
racy of the test for ﬁnding cancer was the attribute most likely to
inﬂuence choice of test, followed by accuracy of the test for ﬁnding
large polyps, and cost. How good the test is at saying you don’t
have cancer was less important in determining choice of test.
Demographic characteristics (age, sex, perceived risk of CRC, and
family history) did not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence choice of test.
Additional results from the ML model pertained to the SD of
the random parameters. The insigniﬁcant parameter estimate for
the estimated SD for LPMISS2 indicated that the dispersion
around the mean is statistically equal to zero; thus, all distribu-
tional information for this parameter was contained within the
mean. The statistically signiﬁcant estimates for derived SD for
random parameters for all other parameters suggested the exist-
ence of heterogeneity around the mean parameter over the
sampled population. The ML model was statistically signiﬁcant
compared to a base model assuming equal choice shares only
(with a chi-square equal to 60,709 with 40 degrees of freedom
and a P-value equal to zero) and had a pseudo R2 of 0.84. The
statistical signiﬁcance of the model was maintained when the ML
model was compared to the MNL model (chi-square equal to
2539.26 [-2 ¥ [-6963.88 - (-5694.25)] with 16 degrees of
freedom, P < 0.0001]), indicating that the ML model was signiﬁ-
cantly better than the MNL model. In addition, the reduction in
AIC indicated that this improvement remained after penalizing
for the loss of parsimonious speciﬁcation in moving from the
MNL to ML.
Value of Cancers Found versus Cancers Missed
The absolute value of the b for the attribute “cancers found” was
compared to the absolute value of b for the attribute “cancers
missed” in two circumstances: ﬁrst, when the speciﬁcity attribute
“how accurate the test is at saying you do not have cancer” was
Table 2 Variables and descriptions for MNL and ML models
Model variables
Variables Description
Random parameters
(in ML only)
CAFIND1* How many cancers the test will ﬁnd (out of 100 cancers) (Frame 1)
CAFIND3* How many cancers the test will ﬁnd (out of 100 cancers) (Frame 3)
CAMISS2* How many cancers the test will miss (out of 100 cancers) (Frame 2)
CAMISS4* How many cancers the test will miss (out of 100 cancers) (Frame 4)
LPFIND1* How many large polyps the test will ﬁnd (out of 100 cancers) (Frame 1)
LPFIND3* How many large polyps the test will ﬁnd (out of 100 cancers) (Frame 3)
LPMISS2* How many large polyps the test will miss (out of 100 cancers) (Frame 2)
LPMISS4* How many large polyps the test will miss (out of 100 cancers) (Frame 4)
REASS1* How many people correctly reassured by the test that they do not have cancer (out of 1000 people tested) (Frame 1)
REASS4* How many people correctly reassured by the test that they do not have cancer (out of 1000 people tested) (Frame 4)
UNCOL2* How many people have unnecessary colonoscopies (out of 1000 people tested) (Frame 2)
UNCOL3* How many people have unnecessary colonoscopies (out of 1000 people tested) (Frame 3)
Nonrandom parameters
Constant1 Alternative speciﬁc constant (Frame 1)
Constant2 Alternative speciﬁc constant (Frame 2)
Constant3 Alternative speciﬁc constant (Frame 3)
Constant4 Alternative speciﬁc constant (Frame 4)
COST1 Cost of the test (Frame 1)
COST2 Cost of the test (Frame 2)
COST3 Cost of the test (Frame 3)
COST4 Cost of the test (Frame 4)
AGE Age (continuous)
SEX Sex (0 = female, 1 = male)
RISK Perceived risk of colorectal cancer (low/average [0]; higher than average [1])
FAMHISTORY Has anyone in your family had colorectal cancer (no [0]; yes [1])
*Normal distribution applied in analyses.
ML, mixed logit; MNL, multinomial logit.
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expressed as “number reassured” (comparison of Frames 1 and
4), and second, when it is framed as “number of unnecessary
colonoscopies” (comparison of Frames 2 and 3).
When the speciﬁcity attribute “how accurate the test is at
saying you do not have cancer” was expressed as “number
reassured” the absolute value for “cancers found” was 0.2157
(95% CI 0.2022–0.2293), compared to “cancers missed” at
0.2065 (95% CI 0.1948–0.2182). Thus, as the conﬁdence inter-
vals overlap, framing of the test sensitivity attribute (cancers
found compared to cancers missed) did not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
the valuation of this attribute.
When the speciﬁcity attribute “how accurate the test is at
saying you do not have cancer” was expressed as “unnecessary
colonoscopies,” the absolute value for “cancers found” was
0.2160 (95% CI 0.1965–0.2355), compared to “cancers missed”
at 0.1744 (95% CI 0.1568–0.1920). Here, conﬁdence intervals
do not overlap; framing of the test sensitivity attribute signiﬁ-
cantly inﬂuenced its valuation.
Value of Large Polyps Found versus Large
Polyps Missed
A similar pattern of framing effects was seen for “large polyps
found” and “large polyps missed.” When the speciﬁcity attribute
“how accurate the test is at saying you do not have cancer” was
expressed as “number reassured,” the conﬁdence intervals of b
coefﬁcients overlap, and framing effects were not signiﬁcant.
When the speciﬁcity attribute “how accurate the test is at
saying you do not have cancer” was expressed as “unnecessary
colonoscopies,” conﬁdence intervals of b coefﬁcients do not
overlap; framing signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced the valuation of test
accuracy for large polyps; “large polyps found” were valued
more highly than “large polyps missed.”
MRS between Attributes
Willingness to pay estimates in Table 5 were calculated from the
conditional parameter estimates in the ML model. Estimates of
WTP for test attributes were signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by attribute
framing for all comparisons of comparable attributes, as evi-
denced by the lack of overlapping conﬁdence intervals. For
example, respondent’s WTP for an extra cancer found was sig-
niﬁcantly higher when test speciﬁcity attribute was presented as
number people with unnecessary colonoscopies. In the absence of
framing effects, the WTP for one extra cancer found (e.g., $11.45
[$11.24–$11.68]) should also have been the same as the WTP for
one fewer cancer missed (e.g., $9.81 [$9.65–$9.98]).
Table 6 indicates the beneﬁt : harm ratios, as calculated by
MRS between attributes. These ratios indicated the potential
harms that respondents were willing to trade off against one unit
of increased beneﬁt, as measured by one extra cancer found or
one fewer cancer missed. If framing effects exist, one would
expect there to be signiﬁcant differences in the potential harms
people are willing to accept to gain one extra cancer found or one
fewer cancer missed. This is demonstrated in Table 6, as conﬁ-
dence intervals of beneﬁt: harm ratios do not overlap. For
example, in the absence of framing effects, the beneﬁt:harm ratio
of “more cancers found:unnecessary colonoscopies” would equal
the ratio of “fewer cancers missed: unnecessary colonoscopies.”
When the test sensitivity was presented as “cancers found,”
respondents were willing to accept 22.8 more unnecessary
colonoscopies (95% CI 17.9–27.7) for every extra cancer that
the test found. When the test sensitivity was presented as
“cancers missed,” respondents were willing to accept signiﬁ-
cantly less potential harm: 10.4 more unnecessary colonoscopies
(95% CI 8.2–12.5) for every fewer cancer missed by the test.
Discussion
Although framing has been identiﬁed as a potential methodologi-
cal issue in the discrete choice literature [5–9], there has been no
published study in health that has examined the inﬂuence of
attribute framing on choices made during DCEs.
Results from the current study demonstrated that attribute
framing signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced respondent WTP for changes in
Table 3 Characteristics of respondents in each group
Characteristics
Frame 1 Frame 2 Frame 3 Frame 4
N = 298 % N = 291 % N = 278 % N = 290 %
Mean age (range; SD) 63 (40–90; 11.3) 62 (32–88; 11.0) 63 (37–89; 10.4) 63 (37–92; 11.1)
Response rate 62.1% 60.6% 57.2% 60.4%
Sex (F:M) 168:130 56:44 177:114 61:39 159:119 57:43 166:124 57:43
Education
Primary school 1 <1 5 2 6 2 9 3
Some high school 60 21 41 14 45 17 55 20
Completed high school 79 28 76 27 65 24 58 21
TAFE/technical/trade/diploma 86 30 91 32 77 28 83 30
Degree (university or college) 61 21 74 26 80 29 74 26
Employment
Full-time 59 21 56 21 54 20 51 19
Part-time/casual 35 13 44 16 53 20 36 13
Home duties 20 7 15 6 18 7 16 6
Self-funded retirement 70 25 72 27 78 29 78 29
Pension 92 33 78 29 66 25 89 33
Not working 3 1 4 1 0 0 3 1
Private health insurance 215 75 229 80 220 81 219 79
Family history of CRC 74 26 78 28 56 21 69 24
Know someone with CRC 157 56 157 56 168 63 166 59
Self-perceived risk of colorectal cancer
A lot/lower than average 56 20 56 20 52 19 61 21
Average 175 61 152 56 180 67 171 60
A lot/higher than average 54 19 65 24 38 14 52 18
CRC, colorectal cancer.
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attributes. Similarly, the beneﬁt to harm trade-offs from MRS
between test accuracy attributes “cancers found (or missed-
):people reassured” and “cancers found (or missed):unnecessary
colonoscopies” were also signiﬁcantly different depending upon
whether test sensitivity was expressed as cancers found or
cancers missed. These results are consistent with other studies:
Tversky and Kahneman [13] demonstrated the effect of framing
in their “Asian disease” experiment, where information on inter-
ventions (a certain and a risky option with the same expected
value) was presented in terms of “lives saved” or “lives lost.”
Results indicated that framing outcomes as “lives saved” rather
than “lives lost” led to large differences in choice probabilities,
Table 4 Results from multinomial logit (MNL) and mixed logit (ML) models
Variables
MNL model ML model
95% CI 95% CI
B-coeff SE Lower Upper P B-coeff SE Lower Upper P
Random parameters
CAFIND1 Mean 0.1235 0.0038 0.1160 0.1309 <0.00001 0.2157 0.0069 0.2022 0.2293 <0.00001
SD 0.1082 0.0054 0.0976 0.1187 <0.00001
CAFIND3 Mean 0.1423 0.0043 0.1338 0.1508 <0.00001 0.2160 0.0099 0.1965 0.2355 <0.00001
SD 0.1730 0.0060 0.1613 0.1848 <0.00001
CAMISS2 Mean -0.1410 0.0042 -0.1492 -0.1328 <0.00001 -0.1744 0.0090 -0.1920 -0.1568 <0.00001
SD 0.1145 0.0120 0.0911 0.1380 <0.00001
CAMISS4 Mean -0.1079 0.0034 -0.1145 -0.1013 <0.00001 -0.2065 0.0060 -0.2182 -0.1948 <0.00001
SD 0.1968 0.0107 0.1759 0.2177 <0.00001
LPFIND1 Mean 0.0479 0.0029 0.0422 0.0535 <0.00001 0.0761 0.0045 0.0673 0.0848 <0.00001
SD 0.0596 0.0061 0.0476 0.0716 <0.00001
LPFIND3 Mean 0.0577 0.0032 0.0514 0.0639 <0.00001 0.0881 0.0059 0.0765 0.0996 <0.00001
SD 0.0484 0.0060 0.0367 0.0601 <0.00001
LPMISS2 Mean -0.0523 0.0030 -0.0581 -0.0465 <0.00001 -0.0645 0.0030 -0.0703 -0.0586 <0.00001
SD 0.0050 0.0111 -0.0169 0.0268 0.6568
LPMISS4 Mean -0.0408 0.0026 -0.0458 -0.0358 <0.00001 -0.0884 0.0080 -0.1042 -0.0727 <0.00001
SD 0.0868 0.0081 0.0709 0.1026 <0.00001
REASS1 Mean 0.0094 0.0005 0.0084 0.0103 <0.00001 0.0249 0.0013 0.0223 0.0275 <0.00001
SD 0.0319 0.0016 0.0288 0.0350 <0.00001
REASS4 Mean 0.0071 0.0005 0.0062 0.0081 <0.00001 0.0080 0.0016 0.0048 0.0111 <0.00001
SD 0.0276 0.0017 0.0242 0.0310 <0.00001
UNCOL2 Mean -0.0165 0.0013 -0.0191 -0.0140 <0.00001 -0.0200 0.0025 -0.0248 -0.0152 <0.00001
SD 0.0210 0.0020 0.0171 0.0249 <0.00001
UNCOL3 Mean -0.0078 0.0013 -0.0103 -0.0054 <0.00001 -0.0122 0.0030 -0.0181 -0.0064 <0.00001
SD 0.0276 0.0030 0.0218 0.0335 <0.00001
Nonrandom parameters
Constant1 -0.0165 0.1321 -0.2754 0.2425 0.9008 -0.0169 0.1561 -0.3227 0.2890 0.9138
Constant2 -0.0996 0.1304 -0.3551 0.1559 0.4449 -0.1005 0.1603 -0.4146 0.2137 0.5308
Constant3 -0.1064 0.1317 -0.3644 0.1517 0.4192 -0.1062 0.1598 -0.4194 0.2070 0.5064
Constant4 0.0493 0.1311 -0.2076 0.3062 0.7068 0.0501 0.1581 -0.2598 0.3600 0.7513
COST1 -0.0185 0.0026 -0.0236 -0.0135 <0.00001 -0.0338 0.0026 -0.0390 -0.0287 <0.00001
COST2 -0.0165 0.0028 -0.0219 -0.0111 <0.00001 -0.0186 0.0029 -0.0244 -0.0128 <0.00001
COST3 -0.0135 0.0028 -0.0189 -0.0081 <0.00001 -0.0201 0.0032 -0.0263 -0.0138 <0.00001
COST4 -0.0208 0.0024 -0.0255 -0.0161 <0.00001 -0.0455 0.0031 -0.0517 -0.0394 <0.00001
AGE 0.0009 0.0020 -0.0030 0.0047 0.6559 0.0015 0.0022 -0.0029 0.0059 0.5069
SEX -0.0387 0.0432 -0.1234 0.0460 0.3708 -0.0383 0.0514 -0.1391 0.0624 0.4560
RISK -0.0080 0.0616 -0.1287 0.1126 0.8961 -0.0084 0.0811 -0.1673 0.1505 0.9175
FAMHISTORY 0.0545 0.0551 -0.0536 0.1626 0.3229 0.0540 0.0639 -0.0712 0.1791 0.3980
McFadden’s R2 (pseudo R2) 0.18043 0.8416
AIC 0.806 0.309
Log-likelihood -6963.88 -5694.25
AIC,Akaike’s information criterion.
Table 5 Willingness to pay (WTP) for test characteristics
Attribute WTP calculation (b/b) Mean WTP ($) Lower 95% CI Upper 95% CI
$/extra cancer found (F1) bcancers found-F1/bcost-F1 $6.43 $6.35 $6.51
$/extra cancer found (F3) bcancers found-F3/bcost-F3 $11.45 $11.24 $11.66
$/missed cancer avoided (F2) bcancers missed-F2/bcost-F2 $9.81 $9.65 $9.98
$/missed cancer avoided (F4) bcancers missed-F4/bcost-F4 $4.93 $4.83 $5.04
$/extra large polyp found (F1) bLP found-F1/bcost-F1 $2.27 $2.24 $2.31
$/extra large polyp found (F3) bLP found-F3/bcost-F3 $4.38 $4.33 $4.43
$/missed large polyp avoided (F2) bLP missed-F2/bcost-F2 $3.47 $3.47 $3.48
$/missed large polyp avoided (F4) bLP missed-F4/bcost-F4 $2.02 $1.98 $2.07
$/extra person reassured that they don’t have cancer (F1) breassured-F1/bcost-F1 $0.71 $0.69 $0.73
$/extra person reassured that they don’t have cancer (F4) breassured-F4/bcost-F4 $0.23 $0.22 $0.25
$/unnecessary colonoscopy avoided (F2) bunnec. colonosc-F2/bcost-F2 $1.13 $1.10 $1.15
$/unnecessary colonoscopy avoided (F3) bunnec. colonosc-F3/bcost-F3 $0.68 $0.66 $0.71
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with substantially more people favoring the certain option when
it was framed as lives saved (rather than lives lost). Physicians,
students, and clinic patients made different choices of treatments
for lung cancer (surgery or radiation therapy) depending upon
whether outcomes were framed as mortality or survival rates.
Treatment options where outcomes were presented as survival
were viewed more favorably [55]. The increased WTP for cancers
found rather than missed cancers avoided reﬂects an overweight-
ing of a positive outcome and underweighting of a negative
outcome avoided [4]; people are not generating an expected
value as the product of objective probability multiplied by value
of the outcome; instead the value of outcomes is weighted by a
“decision weight” rather than an objective probability [4].
So how do we best deal with the effects of attribute framing?
Unfortunately, no simple answer exists. Druckman [56], in a
repeat of Tversky and Kahneman’s “Asian disease” [13] framing
experiment, has suggested that presentation of both frames of
information may overcome some of the framing effect. In an
experiment which examined alternative frames of information,
including a combined mortality/survival presentation, he found
that 68% of respondents chose the risk-averse alternative with
the survival frame, compared to 23% with the mortality frame
(consistent with Tversky and Kahneman’s original results).
Forty-four percent of the respondents with the “both” format
chose the risk-averse alternative, approximately midway between
the survival and mortality formats. Although his experiment was
based on calculating the proportions of respondents choosing
different options, it is possible that presenting both frames of
attribute information in a DCE may also help overcome framing
effects in this context by explicitly valuing positive and negative
effects separately. This remains to be tested in a DCE context.
Pivot designs [24,57,58] make use of respondents’ experi-
ences as an explicit reference alternative within the choice set.
The reference alternative acts to frame the decision context of the
choice task within some existing remembered context of the
individual and hence “. . . makes preference–revelation more
meaningful at the level of the individual, consistent with prospect
theory.” [23] Attribute levels of an alternative are expressed as a
gain or loss relative to an individual’s reference alternative.
Utility functions (and therefore models) are speciﬁed with sepa-
rate coefﬁcients for increases and decreases in an attribute rela-
tive to some reference point, thereby allowing for asymmetrical
valuations of gains and losses. Although not directly applicable
to the problem presented in this study where one level of an
attribute can be described in multiple ways, we may be able to
apply these design and analysis techniques to better understand
the issue of framing.
Within a policy and service delivery context, there are impor-
tant implications for different estimates of willingness to pay and
MRS with alternative attribute presentations. Development of
methods to assess and account for the magnitude of effect intro-
duced by attribute framing are necessary.
So what are the implications for DCEs in health care and
where do framing effects ﬁt into the conventional process for
conducting and analyzing DCEs [26]? To begin to understand the
inﬂuence of framing, we ﬁrstly need to explicitly look for it in the
studies we conduct. The existing criteria for design and analysis
of DCEs [26] do not consider attribute framing; a complemen-
tary set of criteria is proposed on the right hand side of Figure 1.
Figure 1 is intended to provide a possible set of addition steps
that could be taken to design a study to further characterize
framing effects.
Attributes likely to be inﬂuenced by framing effects such as
risk, probabilistic or cost attributes [5–9] should be identiﬁed a
priori (A). After identiﬁcation of such attributes and the relevant
levels for alternative frames, explicit consideration should be
given during the design of DCEs (B) such that a design allowing
characterization of framing effects can be implemented. Although
we recognize that these processes may not be possible for all
studies, we suggest that if researchers elect not to characterize
framing effects in their DCEs, they should explain and justify the
approach taken, and apply it consistently throughout their study.
The ﬁnal step in Figure 1 involves the appropriate speciﬁca-
tion of advanced models, such as ML models to adequately
capture respondent preferences. Use of ML models also has
implications for design of stated-preference choice experiments,
and there is a growing literature concerning itself with the devel-
opment of statistically efﬁcient designs appropriate for these
models [38,59–63]. So what can decision-makers do in the
interim? Until we know more about framing effects in DCEs, and
how, if at all, we may be able to mathematically adjust for
framing, it may be useful for decision-makers to propose guide-
lines for presentation of results of DCEs. For example, to facili-
tate consistent interpretation of DCE results, in the context of
framing effects, one practical suggestion is that decision-makers
could require that all attributes be expressed in the same direc-
tion (all in the positive or all in the negative frame).
This is one of the ﬁrst studies to examine framing effects in
DCEs. Because we are at such an early stage of examining
framing in DCEs, it is important to ascertain whether the effects
reported in this study are also present across other studies, in
different contexts, and with different respondent populations.
Future discrete choice studies may also care to examine framing
to assess whether the effects on WTP and MRS seen here are
indeed a phenomena that occur in discrete choice studies more
generally. We recognize that more research is needed in this area,
and that the current study has raised a number of issues that
warrant further exploration. It is possible that the magnitude of
framing effects may vary with respondent age, or with other
demographic characteristics, such as experience; temporality of
the attribute (for example, how far in the future a cancer may be
found or missed) may also inﬂuence the value individuals attach
to that attribute, and subsequently the extent of attribute
framing. Prior experience of our study population with FOBT
may mean that they value attributes differently to the general
population. Nevertheless, the question remains whether attribute
framing differentially affects naive or experienced respondents.
Some evidence from medical decision-making suggests that expe-
rience does not help with interpretation or application of risk
information to decision-making, with examples of framing
Table 6 MRS between test characteristics
Beneﬁt:harm ratio MRS calculation (b/b) Mean MRS Lower 95% CI Upper 95% CI
More cancers found:reduction in people reassured (F1) bcancers found-F1/breass-F1 8.6162 3.4072 13.8253
Fewer cancers missed:reduction in people reassured (F4) bcancers missed-F4/breass-F4 24.2039 18.7398 29.6681
More cancers found:unnecessary colonoscopies (F3) bcancers found-F3/buncol-F3 22.7919 17.8861 27.6977
Fewer cancers missed:unnecessary colonoscopies (F2) bcancers missed-F2/buncol-F2 10.3579 8.2341 12.4818
MRS, marginal rates of substitution.
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effects in both naive and experienced respondents [2]. For
example, physicians, students, and clinic patients made different
choices of treatments for lung cancer (surgery or radiation
therapy) depending upon whether outcomes were framed as mor-
tality or survival rates [55]. Consistent patterns of responses were
made regardless of the level of experience of respondents, or their
familiarity with the subject matter. Nevertheless, whether this
holds true in the context of a DCE is unclear at this stage. In
addition, a number of study design and administration issues
may also inﬂuence the extent of framing; our study used a forced
choice design administered as a postal survey; however, it is
unclear whether a design with an opt-out choice, and/or a face to
face survey may have led to different patterns of framing effects.
Further quantiﬁcation of the magnitude and pattern of framing
effects in health-care DCEs under different circumstances, with
different respondent populations and using different survey
designs and administration techniques, will facilitate the devel-
opment of appropriate DCE design and analysis methods.
Conclusions
In conclusion, this study demonstrates that framing of attributes
can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence estimation of WTP, and MRS between
attributes. Ongoing research to ascertain the existence of these
effects in other decision contexts, and ongoing research on
appropriate design and analysis methods will allow further quan-
tiﬁcation of the magnitude of the inﬂuence of framing effects in
DCEs.
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Appendix A Example DCE question
Please compare the two screening tests below. You have decided to have a screening test, and these are the two tests you have to choose
from. Which test would you choose to have?
Example Test 1 Test 2
How many cancers the test will ﬁnd 65 out of 100 55 out of 100
How many large polyps the test will ﬁnd 35 out of 100 45 out of 100
The number of people who are correctly reassured
by the test that they do NOT have cancer
800 out of 1000 people 900 out of 1000 people
The cost to you of the test $20 $30
Dietary or medication restrictions prior to test No No
Collection of the stool sample Brush stool surface gently
then dab on test kit
Brush stool surface gently
then dab on test kit
(please tick one box)
Which would you choose? Test 1

Test 2

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